59 research outputs found
Aboutness in Imagination
I present a formal theory of the logic and aboutness of imagination. Aboutness is understood as the relation between meaningful items and what they concern, as per Yablo and Fineâs works on the notion. Imagination is understood as per Chalmersâ positive conceivability: the intentional state of a subject who conceives that p by imagining a situationâa configuration of objects and propertiesâverifying p. So far aboutness theory has been developed mainly for linguistic representation, but it is natural to extend it to intentional states. The proposed framework combines a modal semantics with a mereology of contents: imagination operators are understood as variably strict quantifiers over worlds with a content-preservation constraint
Knowability Relative to Information
We present a formal semantics for epistemic logic, capturing the notion of knowability relative to information (KRI). Like Dretske, we move from the platitude that what an agent can know depends on her (empirical) information. We treat operators of the form K_AB (âB is knowable on the basis of information Aâ) as variably strict quantifiers over worlds with a topic- or aboutness- preservation constraint. Variable strictness models the non-monotonicity of knowledge acquisition while allowing knowledge to be intrinsically stable. Aboutness-preservation models the topic-sensitivity of information, allowing us to invalidate controversial forms of epistemic closure while validating less controversial ones. Thus, unlike the standard modal framework for epistemic logic, KRI accommodates plausible approaches to the Kripke-Harman dogmatism paradox, which bear on non-monotonicity, or on topic-sensitivity. KRI also strikes a better balance between agent idealization and a non-trivial logic of knowledge ascriptions
Logic will get you from A to B, imagination will take you anywhere
Funding: H2020 European Research Council. Grant Number: 681404.There is some consensus on the claim that imagination as suppositional thinking can have epistemic value insofar as it's constrained by a principle of minimal alteration of how we know or believe reality to be â compatibly with the need to accommodate the supposition initiating the imaginative exercise. But in the philosophy of imagination there is no formally precise account of how exactly such minimal alteration is to work. I propose one. I focus on counterfactual imagination, arguing that this can be modeled as simulated belief revision governed by Laplacian imaging. So understood, it can be rationally justified by accuracy considerations: it minimizes expected belief inaccuracy, as measured by the Brier score.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe
Adding 4.0241 to TLP
Tractatus 4.024 inspired the dominant semantics of our time: truth-conditional semantics. Such semantics is focused on possible worlds: the content of p is the set of worlds where p is true. It has become increasingly clear that such an account is, at best, defective: we need an âindependent factor in meaning, constrained but not determined by truth-conditionsâ (Yablo 2014, p. 2), because sentences can be differently true at the same possible worlds. I suggest a missing comment which, had it been included in the Tractatus, would have helped semantics get this right from the start. This is my 4.0241: âKnowing what is the case if a sentence is true is knowing its ways of being trueâ: knowing a sentenceâs truth possibilities and what we now call its topic, or subject matter. I show that the famous âfundamental thoughtâ that âthe âlogical constantsâ do not representâ (4.0312) can be understood in terms of ways-based views of meaning. Such views also help with puzzling claims like 5.122: âIf p follows from q, the sense of âpâ is contained in the that of âqââ, which are compatible with a conception of entailment combining truth-preservation with the preservation of topicality, or of ways of being true
Equivalence in imagination
This research is published within the Project âThe Logic of Conceivabilityâ, Funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), Grant Number 681404.One sense of âimaginationâ that matters in epistemology has the word mean âreality-oriented mental simulationâ (ROMS): we suppose that something is the case, develop the supposition by importing background knowledge and beliefs, and check what is true in the imagined scenario. What is the logic of ROMS? Imagination has a reputation for being logically anarchic. In particular, itâs hyperintensional: we can imagine A without imagining a necessarily equivalent B. This work considers a Principle of Equivalence in Imagination which, if accepted, will limit the anarchy: when A and B are equivalent in imagination, one will imagine the same things after supposing either in ROMS. What is equivalence in imagination? It is suggested that itâs cognitive equivalence. A and B are cognitively equivalent for one when they play the same role in oneâs cognitive life: whatever one understands, concludes, etc., given either, one does, given the other. ROMS is logically modelled via variably strict modals. Two formal semantics are proposed for them: one uses possible worlds plus an algebra of topics; the other resorts to impossible worlds. The two deal with equivalence in imagination in subtly different ways.Publisher PD
The logic of framing effects
Funding: This research is published within the project âThe Logic of Conceivabilityâ, funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), grant number 681404.Framing effects concern the having of different attitudes towards logically or necessarily equivalent contents. Framing is of crucial importance for cognitive science, behavioral economics, decision theory, and the social sciences at large. We model a typical kind of framing, grounded in (i) the structural distinction between beliefs activated in working memory and beliefs left inactive in long term memory, and (ii) the topic- or subject matter-sensitivity of belief: a feature of propositional attitudes which is attracting growing research attention. We introduce a class of models featuring (i) and (ii) to represent, and reason about, agents whose belief states can be subject to framing effects. We axiomatize a logic which we prove to be sound and complete with respect to the class.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe
Cognitive synonymy : a dead parrot?
Funding: This research is published within the project âThe Logic of Conceivabilityâ, funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), Grant Number 681404.Sentences Ï and Ï are cognitive synonyms for one when they play the same role in oneâs cognitive life. The notion is pervasive (Sect. 1), but elusive: it is bound to be hyperintensional (Sect. 2), but excessive fine-graining would trivialize it and there are reasons for some coarse-graining (Sect. 2.1). Conceptual limitations stand in the way of a natural algebra (Sect. 2.2), and it should be sensitive to subject matters (Sect. 2.3). A cognitively adequate individuation of content may be intransitive (Sect. 3) due to âdead parrotâ series: sequences of sentences Ï1,âŠ,Ïn where adjacent Ïi and Ïi+1 are cognitive synonyms while Ï1 and Ïn are not (Sect. 3.1). Finding an intransitive account is hard: Fregean equipollence wonât do (Sect. 3.2) and a result by Leitgeb shows that it wouldnât satisfy a minimal compositionality principle (Sect. 3.3). Sed contra, there are reasons for transitivity, too (Sect. 3.4). In Sect. 4, we come up with a formal semantics capturing this jumble of desiderata, thereby showing that the notion is coherent. In Sect. 5, we re-assess the desiderata in its light.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe
Williamson on Indicatives and Suppositional Heuristics
Timothy Williamson has defended the claim that the semantics of the indicative âifâ is given by the material conditional. Putative counterexamples can be handled by better understanding the role played in our assessment of indicatives by a fallible cognitive heuristic, called the Suppositional Procedure. Williamsonâs Suppositional Conjecture has it that the Suppositional Procedure is humansâ primary way of prospectively assessing conditionals. This paper raises some doubts on the Suppositional Procedure and Conjecture
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